and even these works are frequently plagued by incomplete, conflicting and counter intuitive results.5
This article seeks to overcome such past deficiencies in considering the techincal payoffs from computerization. First, the data are collected from 42 leading-edge cities in the United States in 1976 and from 46 such cities in 1988.
The data are quantitative and were collected by established principles of survey research and sampling design. Second, the data include a panel of cities; 37 of the cities are in both the 1976 and 1988 databases. The panel data from leading-edge cities permit study of the possibility that part of the conflicting and vague prior findings on the impacts of computerization could be due to the various different stages of computerization in the organization(s) studied as well as to differences in the stage of the technology itself. To be specific, the panel nature of the data allow exploration of whether some payoffs come quickly from automation whereas others take time. The same can be said for problems with computing. The early literature on the impacts of computing suggested that computing was likely to have many negative effects as well as positive benefits. 6 Panel data allow exploration of whether problems that existed early in computerization persist or have been dealt with and minimized over time.
Third, the analysis focuses on the general payoffs from computerization, payoffs that would be relevant to any governmental department or task and payoffs that were touted in the early days of computerization. This focus reduces the possibility that part of the conflicting and vague prior findings on the impacts of computerization could be due to the choice of technical payoffs studied.
The following payoffs are examined: increased availability Are governments that adopted computers early receiving the payoffs today? Yes, but a major finding of this panel (1976) (1977) (1978) (1979) (1980) (1981) (1982) (1983) (1984) (1985) (1986) (1987) (1988) ) study of 46 U.S. cities is that most payoffs from computerization are not felt immediately. Instead they take years to reach fruition. The major payoffs occur in the areas offiscal control, cost avoidance, and better interaction with the public. But some anticipated benefits, such as better information for planning and managerial control, still have not been realized-even by cities that were on the leading edge of automation in the 1970s. Moreover, the prospects for future payoffs in these areas are mixed.
SEPTEMBER/OCTOBER 1990 of information, better information for management control, better information for city planning decisions, greater efficiency of operational performance, and better interaction with the public. 7 In addition, the study considers computerization's possible negative effects dealing with the technical quality of information and computer services. The actual measures used in the analysis were developed in 1976 based on the common complaints and promises regarding computerization heard in the practitioner, academic, and vendor circles.
The study hypothesizes that prior studies did not consistently find technical payoffs from computerization for several reasons other than methodological ones, although methodological reasons could be part of the explanation.
First, most payoffs take time to be realized.
Computerization of information and tasks is done in stages, and there is a learning curve for user personnel as well as for the technologists (software development).
Second, payoffs most clearly are realized in the more simple tasks such as recordkeeping rather than across the board. Third, some payoffs may be realized only at a minimal level even after years of experience by the most technologically advanced cities due to the political nature of the tasks. For example, payoffs from computerization for planning and management decisions are a minor part of these tasks given the often overriding influence of intuition, judgment and politics.
Data and Methods
The data for this article were collected as part of two studies referred to as URBIS I and URBIS 1:, which were conducted through the Public Policy Research Organization at the University of California, Irvine, and supported by grants from the National Science Foundation.8 The method here is derived from the URBIS I design. In 1976, information was gathered from 42 cities in the United States. These cities were chosen using an innovative design to sample different types of cities purposely rather than to sample randomly all cities per se. Through an initial mail survey inquiring about computer services in every city over 50,000 in population (N = 403), data were collected to stratify cities on six policy variables. These included the degree of (1) automation, (2) centralization, (3) data integration, (4) technical sophistication, (5) user involvement, and (6) charging for services.
Thus, the sample reflects leading-edge cities, not simply in terms of technology but also in terms of computing practices.
Each variable was dichotomized, yielding 64 possible combinations. Forty groups out of the possible 64 were randomly selected, and then a city in each group was randomly selected. Two additional cities were added due to resource allowance. In 1988 five of the original cities were unable to participate again, and therefore new cities were added to the original sample. Nine new cities were added and were chosen to reflect the single most important change in local government computing since the mid-1970s-the proliferation of personal computers, especially among cities between 50,000 and 99,999 in population.
Consequently, the 1988 sample represents leading-edge cities for that year and thereby permits this research to address whether there are payoffs by 1988. The cities reflect the diversity, although not proportionately, of United States cities in terms of population, region, and current state of computing practices (see appendix).
The methods for this article focus on leading-edge cities and the computer users within those cities as predictors of where the majority of cities and government employees will be in the future. Thus, while the two samples are biased toward more technically advanced cities and toward those city employees who use computers and information systems, the design has a distinct advantage for the purpose of this analysis. Specifically, the purpose is to chart the payoffs from, and problems with, automation. Technically advanced cities by definition would potentially be the first to realize generalized payoffs as well as problems from computerization since they were the first to automate and then to automate extensively. Because they had no one to look to and learn from, they may actually have experienced more problems. Moreover, technically advanced cities would, by definition, have the most experience with automation and thus should have the best chance to realize benefits while reducing costs over time. Finally, this article is also concerned with the future payoffs from automation, and thus the sampling frame uses cities which are technologically advanced today as predictors of the common state of computerization in government in the future.
This article uses only the responses of chief executives, department managers, and division heads given its focus on payoffs. An average of 26 such respondents per city, 1,185 total, filled out anonymous questionnaires on computing use in 1988, which is more than an 80% response rate. The 1976 data had a 91% response rate.9 Of the 1988 respondents, 45% had worked for their city for 12 or more years, 52% for less than 12 years, with 3% unknown.
The overall average number of years in their respective departments was approximately 12. Consequently, while all the respondents had not been in the same cities in 1976, a great many of them had been. Moreover, it is not necessary to have the exact same respondents in 1988 as in 1976 because the questions were not worded to cover the 12 years, but only whether computers have had an effect. Furthermore, a large array of computer applications were introduced into these cities after 1976. Finally, for the purposes of this article, responses were aggregated by city to reflect the organizational state of computerization as viewed by management. (The responses of chief executives, department managers, and division heads did not differ when analyzed separately.)
The data are based on the perceptions of these top managers. It can be argued that perceptions are not necessarily the most valid measures of computer payoffs. Yet, top managers act on the basis of their perceptions. For example, computer adoption decisions, which this article argues will affect future payoffs, are heavily dependent on managers' perceptions of payoffs. In addition, managers' per-SEPTEMBER/OCTOBER 1990 ceptions provide the most direct measure possible for some payoffs, such as whether computerized information is helpful in identifying problems or providing information about employee performance. If the information exists and does not reach managers or is not used by them, it is not helpful. Moreover, top managers are in positions to know whether payoffs are realized because they receive reports, budgets, problems, complaints and praise about computing. In addition, during the fieldwork in each city, managers were consistently asked to back up their perceptions with actual examples where, for instance, computerized information helped to change a management decision or resulted in cost savings. The perception-based data in this article complements the pattern of responses in the interviews. Furthermore, with their years of firsthand experience with computers, the managers, if anything, should be less sanguine about computers because it is hard to achieve the promised payoffs immediately. For example, one may notice cost savings early on and then forget it or discount it as operations, services, and clients naturally increase. But if massive computer effects exist, the perceptual data should reflect them. Complimentarily, aggregating individual responses to the city level should reduce perceptual errors stemming from any single manager's short tenure in a department. Finally, given that not all respondents may have been around to observe payoffs and given that payoffs might be subtle and marginal and thus less easy to detect, the data may underrepresent impacts. In fact, any perceived improvement from 1976 to 1988 could be argued to be less than more direct measures would obtain.
Findings About Technical Quality of Computerized Information and Computer Services
Before beginning the analysis of the payoffs from computerization, it is necessary to consider what is an obvious given or assumption of computerization; that is, that the technical quality of information and the provision of computer services are good. It is unlikely that cost savings will be realized, for instance, if no one uses computerized information because it is inaccurate. Then again, the data might be accurate, but one rarely refers to them because it takes too long to get, e.g., the computer is down, or one has low priority, or the data processing staff is just slow. Hence, the technical quality of computerized information and computer services are key determinants of even the possibility of payoffs from computerization, and therefore this study begins by considering technical quality and accuracy in particular.
Accuracy is a basic concern in terms of how information is kept. If the data are not accurate, they become useless or problem plagued. Thus, it is important that computerized data be as accurate as manual data. While manual data is not error free, manual data is the standard. Hence, it is essential that computerized data be at least as accurate as manual data. The experience of the sample cities is that this has been very much the case and has steadily held true SEPTEMBER/OC~TOBER 1990 over time. Table 1 shows the managers' index of agreement in 1976 and 1988 with a statement regarding the accuracy of information. The median score across all managers was "somewhat agree" to "agree" in 1976 and a significant change to "nearly always true" in 1988 (see Table 1 ). Thus, managers' rating of the accuracy of computerized information was high in the mid 1970s and has increased with time. While accurate data is essential, computerized data also should neither take a long time to get nor be difficult to change. Otherwise, any anticipated payoffs would be diluted by the poor technical quality of manipulating computerized information. Both in terms of quickness of access and correcting of computerized data, the managers in the study's cities tended to have had positive experiences in 1976 (see Table 1 ). But, by 1988, they experienced no significant improvements in either of these two areas (Table 1) . Perhaps, the lack of significant improvement is due to managers asking for more sophisticated computer-based information in 1988 than in 1976.
As their experiences with computers and their capabilities have increased, so too might their demands. Or perhaps systems, once operational, are inflexible in terms of quickness of access and ease of correcting data.
Overall, then, the technical quality of information needed to be good from the start if automation was to become the wave of the future in cities. The respondents indicate that technical quality was and has continued to be good, but there is room for improvement.
Another key technical concern is the quality of the data processing operations. Frequent organizational changes, foul-ups in the day-to-day computer operation, poor response by data processing staff to requests for information or lack of priority can frustrate computer users. If the computer always seems to be down or if one has to wait a week for information that is needed today, then the accuracy of computerized information becomes meaningless since it is not accessible in a timely manner.
In 1976 such occurrences were perceived to be a problem at times (see Table 1 ). While they represented a low level of problems, they were nonetheless pervasive. Today computer problems such as poor response time and organizational changes are still rare. Clearly the priority problem has been significantly tempered by the spread of personal computers (PCs) and can only get better from the continued diffusion of PCs. In addition, organization and hardware hassles have remained low even as computer services have expanded. Therefore, given that every city has some automation and PCs have sharply accelerated the rate and level of automation, the authors predict that operational problems with data processing services will continue to remain minimal. 10 Given that these technical aspects of computerization are uniformly good across U.S. cities, one can now consider the extent to which the general payoffs of computerization are being achieved. The focus here is on five general payoffs: (1) increased availability of information, (2) better information for management control, (3) better information for city planning decisions, (4) greater efficiency of operational performance, and (5) better interaction with the public.
Payoffs in Increased Availability of Information
Information improvements are the basic selling points of computers. Entering, storing, and accessing information in or through a computer is supposed to make it easier and quicker to access information when needed to answer a question or to make a decision. One no longer has to search file cabinets, make phone calls, or ask someone to get information. All one has to do is go to a terminal or computer keyboard and search. And this can be done even after normal working hours, in a car, or at home in addition to at work. Thus, ease of retrieval and time savings are two key improvements supposedly stemming from computerization. In addition, since information can also be entered or changed at ease by those closest to the current situation, data tend to be more current. Furthermore, the restructuring capabilities of computers allow for standard data to be grouped, broken down, or mathematically altered, thereby providing new information.1 Intriguingly, while the technical quality of computerized information was good in the mid-1970s, the basic payoffs in better information from computerization were mixed (see Table 2 ). The managers in the study's cities "disagreed somewhat" over whether new information was made available, but "agreed somewhat" that computers saved time, computers made it easier to get information, and computers provided them with more up-to-date information. By 1988 these managers were frequently and significantly seeing new information payoffs as well as continuing to see payoffs in ease of retrieval, timesaving, and more up-to-date information (see Table 2 ). In fact, the payoffs in availability of information between 1976 and 1988 may well be underestimated given the change in Table 2 Computer Impacts on Availability of Information The computer provides me with more up-to-date information than that previously available. 2 2
The computer makes new information available to me which was not previously available. SEPTEMBER/OCTOBER 1990 ed "somewhat agree" but in 1988 represented "frequently true."
Such information payoffs are expected to continue as cities continue to accelerate their automation. For instance, on average these cities plan to automate 57 additional applications within the next two years. However, experience with computerized information can create an unending appetite for data. Given that all data are not automated, are not automated in the way one would want, or are not available to everyone, some problems with the availability of information will continue as dependence on computerized information increases (see Table 2 , information problems).
Payoffs in Better Information for Management Control
Beginning in the 1960s, the computer began to be perceived as a tool for management control.'2 Although a number of organizational resources might be computerized in the interest of managerial control (e.g., money, personnel, equipment), budget control traditionally has been the chief instrument of monetary control and, indirectly, of other resource control as well.'3 Some form of budgetcontrol automation has existed for years in the nation's largest cities. However, it was the urban fiscal crisis of the 1970s that provided the spark for wider-scale budget-control automation.s4 The computer's capacity for assisting in budget and managerial control was perceived as a major tool for handling the crisis.
In the mid-1970s computer-based information was considered "somewhat useful" in day-to-day expenditure decisions and in providing the real costs of programs and activities and "useful" during the annual budget cycle (see Table 3 ). Computer-based information has remained as useful with no significant improvements by 1988.
On the one hand then, budgetary computerization has provided a moderate amount of managerial fiscal control which has not increased over time. On the other hand, the level of managerial fiscal control resulting from computerization is inherently limited. This limitation has been especially felt since the 1970s when inflation, the energy crisis, and the withdrawal of federal monies dramatically constrained city governments. Technological improvements can contribute to managerial fiscal control, but the contributions are constrained by outside factors. Given these constraints, managerial fiscal control may very well be less driven by computerization. For example, a city might obtain a ten percent improvement in managerial fiscal control after a major new software package is introduced; but if a similar city were hit by recession, it might only obtain a one percent increase in managerial fiscal control from introducing the same software package. But if it were not for computerization, the city might have experienced a serious decline. In fact, put in this context, the steady state in managerial control stemming from computerization of budget information since the mid-1970s could be actually impressive when weighed against SEPTEMBER/OC~TOBER 1990 the dramatic increase in constraints that forced budget control into crisis control during this time.
Aside from fiscal issues, computerized information can aid in other aspects of managerial control. "Can" is clearly the watchword here. Computerized information generally was rated "not at all useful" for nonbudgetary aspects of managerial control by the cities in the mid-1970s with a significant move toward "somewhat useful" in only two personnel areas by 1988 (see Table 3 ). To be specific, when it comes to allocating manpower, setting goals, identifying internal problems, and assessing employee performance, computerized information has not lived up to claims of usefulness or to its probable potential (see Table 3 ).
Why the near failure in these areas? Mainly, applications of computers for management control have not yet been developed outside the fiscal area. Recordkeeping was and is the driving force of most computerization in local government. Thus information tasks that have a dominant recordkeeping component to them, such as budget reporting, tend to be automated first and are the most understood and well developed. Complementarily, the only significant increases in usefulness of all computerized management control tasks are in the provision of performance information and allocating manpower, which are likely to be set up in a recordkeeping form (see Table 3 ). Therefore, until better management control applications are developed, serious management control payoffs are not expected from computerized information, except in the fiscal area. Moreover such control payoffs are likely to be constrained by the professional versus political nature of the city administration. As other published work from the URBIS research indicates, the more professional the administration is (e.g., the city is headed by a professional manager) and the more it follows professional management practices, the more likely the administration supports decision making aided by applications such as computer models.15
Payoffs in Better Information for City Planning Decisions
The situation for planning decisions is as poor as it is for management control other than fiscal. Managers in the sample cities see computer-based information for city planning as barely useful in 1976 and the same in 1988 (see Table 3 ). The usefulness of computerized data in planning, decisions is severely limited by the quality of database management applications and especially by the political factors that necessarily must be taken into account in decision making. For instance, many planning decisions require data that identify community conditions (e.g., housing supply, occupancy, ownership, condition). Such data are or can be automated in most cities. At the same time, setting up computer models that identify city problems or evaluate solutions to problems is far more complex. Such models would require criteria for defining problems and evaluating solutions, analysis of data in several files, and information that cannot be automated, such as interest group feelings about problems or support for various solutions. Moreover, there has been a clear trend in planning decisions for well over ten years now to devalue community statistics and, instead, to emphasize the opinions of the affected citizens. Given this trend, along with supporting data from this research, it is likely that computerized information will have little impact on city planning decisions in the near future.
Payoffs in Greater Efficiency of Operational Performance
Computers are supposed to have their greatest impacts on the operational efficiency of governmental departments.'6 The computer's vast capabilities for storing, retrieving, and processing information were expected to pare down rapidly the "army of clerks" in city and county halls, thereby reducing costs without a loss in service effectiveness. However, it has been apparent for some time that staff and cost savings from automation occur mainly in large-volume, highly repetitive information processing tasks such as tax, utility, and other large volume processing operations. Because many government functions involve many varied, small-volume information processing tasks, the overall efficiency benefits from computing b. The problem index is the median of the median response within each city across all top managers, where individuals' responses were scored as: 0, not a problem; 1, at times a problem; 2, often a problem; 3, very often a problem.
c. The wording of these questions was changed for table comparability. The question actually said "sometimes" instead of "seldom." * Significant at the .05 level or below determined by the two-sample median test.
have been considerably less than expected.'7 This situation is reflected in the perceptions of the managers, who "somewhat disagree" that computers produce staff reductions and "somewhat agree" that computers produce cost savings (see Table 4 ). Yet the dashed hopes for large cost savings from most municipal automation can be replaced by the satisfactions from cost avoidance which the managers "somewhat agree" has occurred (see Table 4 ). In fact, no city disagreed or even somewhat disagreed with this payoff.
The reason why there have not been significant, observable staff savings may be attributable to the fact that (1) computerization allows new services to be offered as well as greater volume of work to be performed, i.e., more work done with about the same size staff, and (2) creates SEPTEMBER/OCTOBER 1990 the need for new jobs in many departments to support the computer applicationss. Therefore, if operational efficiency is improved through computerization, it is improved by avoiding higher personnel costs and not necessarily by cutting present or preautomation costs. Finally, only those information processing tasks that experience higher volume growth or offer new services realize major cost avoidance. While staff and cost savings from computer use may not be immediately apparent, managers are no longer concerned about the "high cost of computer use" (see Table 2 ). It may be that they feel the benefits outweigh the costs or that the costs of computer use have declined substantially.
Payoffs in Better Interaction with the Public
The promised benefits of computerization were many, and they were directly pitched to appeal to managers and mayors. Citizens were also said to benefit for they would live in a better managed and more effective and efficient city. Still, these are indirect citizen benefits and collective goods. Yet, some direct benefits accrue to citizens; when they individually initiate contacts with the *city. Computers can make citizens' requests for information easier to the extent that computerization has increased the availability of information while maintaining technical quality (see Tables 1 and 2 ). In 1976 and 1988 citizens were somewhat realizing this benefit from computerization (see Table 4 ). In addition, while computerization increased during this time period, there was a perceived significant decrease in citizens' frustrations with computerized data (see Table 4 ). Thus, while automation can increase government effectiveness and efficiency, at times an intangible benefit to citizens, it is important that it also improve direct government-citizen relations, which is a very tangible benefit to citizens.
Conclusion
The computer industry promoted computers with stories of untold benefits that would result from the introduction of computers into the workplace. Little was said about the technical quality of computerized information. Very quickly, automating workplaces realized that more questions should have been asked about the accuracy and ease of manipulation of automated files. Then there were also the unanticipated organizational and hardware problems. Still, while such problems tended to come as a surprise, they were not major problems in terms of their frequency and manageability. Admittedly, they were sometimes a source of major frustration for employees and citizens alike.
Good technical quality of information is an essential characteristic of computerized information, but in itself it is not a benefit or payoff. On the most fundamental level, computerization was supposed to increase the availability of information. Yet, by the mid-1970s the payoffs in better information were mixed.
In 1976 what specific payoffs were United States cities perceived to be receiving from computerization? Answer: more fiscal control, some cost avoidance, better interaction with the public, and a bare improvement in information for planning decisions (see Table 5 ). What payoffs were these cities perceived to be receiving? Answer:
overall improvements in availability of information, infor- The answer appears to be a qualified yes, but there is still much room for improvement (see Table 5 ). By 1988, cities were experiencing the most payoffs in the areas of fiscal control, cost avoidance, and better interaction with the public (see Table 5 ). A minimal level of payoffs were observed in nonfiscal management control and planning decisions. Some cost savings were cited as were payoffs in increased availability of information (see Table 5 ).
And what further payoffs from automation does the future hold for U.S. cities and governments in general? Newer and more up-to-date information that is easier to access will be the hallmark of future automation (see Table 1 ). More available information was the basic selling point of computers, and it is generally perceived to have lived up to those promises. This finding is important because record searching is the common denominator of all computer tasks.19 Another sizeable payoff is better interaction with the public. While this may be considered only as a nice "side dividend" from automation, positive benefits were received early and continued to improve ( Table 5 ). Another payoff now and in the future is cost avoidance (see Table 5 ). In contrast, net cost savings are still low (Table 5 ). It appears that probably high volume tasks and ones which can offer new services are the only major beneficiaries of direct cost savings. Finally, while better information for fiscal control was an early payoff, there is clearly room for improvement although it appears at first puzzling that no significant amount has taken place in the last 12 years (Table 5 ). In actuality, we hypothesize that the steady state from 1976 to 1988 may be impressive when weighed against the major financial constraints in cities that occurred in the late 1970s. Moreover, we are confident that more sophisticated analysis of financial data can result in greater fiscal control as the fiscal crunch of cities is reduced and given that some cities have experienced strong fiscal control improvements. But we are less confident that more extensive and intensive computerization in the federal government would have similar effects on fiscal control given the looming deficits.
Newer and more up-to-date information that is easier to access will be the hallmark of future automation.
In contrast, the payoffs from automation in regard to nonfiscal management control and planning decisions have been barely realized even in leading-edge cities by 1988 ( cars are more cost effective then two-person cars. The decision to go to one-person cars has to be balanced with officer safety concerns and union demands, factors that are hard to fit meaningfully into computer models. In essence, political judgment and insight are still key to good management decisions and cannot be supplanted by computerization. Planners and policy makers are especially cognizant of this reality. Thus, major payoffs in nonfiscal management control and planning decisions are not expected in the near future although there definitely is room for improvement.
In conclusion, based on this longitudinal panel study of 37 leading-edge cities in the United States, the expected payoffs from automation have been slow to be realized, but that may be the nature of the "beast." Yet there is a potential for future improvements. Such improvements can be achieved, as demonstrated by a few leading-edge cities. However, given the data and their admittedly perceptual nature, managers should continue to focus computer dollars on applications that have a large recordkeeping component such as financial, personnel, and land records, as well as utility bills, traffic tickets, etc. More sophisticated applications, such as those information systems which set and measure goals whether internally (to departments) or externally (to larger community planning decisions), appear to be a long way away from delivery of major payoffs if, in fact, the political nature of these application tasks will ever allow them to be dramatically affected by computerization. Finally, data accuracy and accessibility to data are necessary preconditions for success, but they do not guarantee success early if, at times, at all.
The longitudinal nature, as well as sampling frame of this data, appears to be advantageous for sorting out some of the conflicting and incomplete findings of prior theoretical and empirical studies. Yet, future research needs to explore how the attitudes of management, as well as the organizational structure, impact the payoffs from automation.
Equally important, future research should take a more micro approach by concentrating on the automation pay-SEPTEMBER/OCTOBER 1990 offs in specific types of information processing tasks.
This more micro level of analysis could target payoffs stemming from specialized software as well as from variations in tasks themselves. It can also focus on questions of productivity. The macro approach taken in the present article can mask and does not attempt to address payoffs and problems unique to different information processing tasks in government. In addition, a micro approach could include harder measures of payoffs.
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